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Abstract As life expectancy increases and fertility declines, population aging puts
pressure on the financing of welfare states in Europe and other developed countries.
Given that immigrant workers are younger than the domestic population, a continuous
flow of immigrants reduces the old-age dependency ratio and improves financing.
Existing general equilibrium estimates of the public finance contribution of migration,
performed with different models, are not comparable across countries and sometimes
differ even in sign. We use the same overlapping-generations model with a detailed
representation of institutions and labormarket activity to provide comparable estimates
of the impact of immigration on public finance in four European countries.We find that
future projected immigration flows are equivalent to 14.3% points labor income taxes
inAustria, 7.3 points inGermany, 6.2 points in theUKand 1.7 points in Poland in 2060.
These differences are due to the projected volume of immigration and institutional
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setups, among other factors. For comparable volumes of immigration, future flows
have largest impact in Germany and smallest in the UK.
Keywords Immigration · Population aging · Social security financing · General
equilibrium · Cross-country comparisons
JEL Classification D58 · E60 · H55 · J11 · J21 · J61
1 Introduction
Driven by drops in fertility and increases in life expectancy, population aging puts
pressure on the financing of pensions and other social security expenditures. Immi-
gration is a topic of policy debate not only for social reasons, but also for economic
ones. Immigrant workers could help deal with current labor supply shortages in boom-
ing sectors of European economies (Zimmermann 2005). Younger than average, they
reduce the old-age dependency ratio,1 which can help deal with the financing chal-
lenge of old-age expenditures (Borjas 1994). Using different macroeconomic models,
existing country-specific studies provide disparate estimates of the financial contribu-
tion of migration. Our goals are to provide comparable general equilibrium estimates
for four representative European countries and to investigate the role of demographic,
labor markets and institutional factors in cross-country outcome differences.
According to demographic projections from Eurostat (2011), the old-age depen-
dency ratio in the EuropeanUnion should rise from 26% in 2014 to 53% in 2060.With
a smaller share of workers, an increasing number of retirees and a moderate pace of
social security reforms, population aging creates a financing challenge for the typical
pay-as-you-go pensions systems in Europe, aswell as health and long-term care expen-
ditures. According to the Ageing Working Group (2012), total old-age social security
expenditures should increase 4 % points of GDP in the European Union between 2010
and 2060.Without migration, the old-age dependency ratio would increase even more,
to 61%.The long-termfinancial contribution of immigration to old-age financing how-
ever varies across countries, due to differences in immigration volumes, institutional
settings, workforce composition, immigrant skill levels and other factors. Long-term
macroeconomic financial incentives associated with immigration thus vary across
countries, influencing immigration-related policy in various degrees. As a response to
the 2015 European refugee crisis, several countries have been lobbying for an increase
in the degree of coordination of national-level immigration policy. Consistent quan-
titative estimates of the financial contribution of immigration are thus required for
policy comparison and to inform policy makers involved in coordination.
Although estimates exist for a number of countries, they are provided in different
studies using different models. Table 1 provides an overview of relevant quantitative
estimates available in the general equilibrium literature and shows their disparity. For
instance, Schou (2006) predicts that immigration has a negative impact on public
1 The old-age dependency ratio is the ratio of the population older than 65 years over the population aged
between 15 and 64 years.
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Table 1 Estimates of migration long-run impacts with population aging
Country Source Long-run effects of yearly migration shock of −0.1% of population
GDP/capita
(%)
Labor tax
(% points)
Consumption
tax (% points)
Pension deficit
(% points GDP)
Denmark Schou (2006) 0.9 −0.1
Italy Magnani (2011) 0.6
Spain Izquierdo et al. (2010) −2.2 2.5 1.7
Europe Fehr et al. (2003) −13.3 2.4
USA Storesletten (2000) 0.3
USA Fehr et al. (2003) −11.8 0.7
USA Chojnicki et al. (2011) 0.4 0.3
Changes in GDP per capita, taxes and pension deficit after 50 years, normalized to the same migration
shock (−0.1% of population) assuming proportional impacts; only general equilibrium analysis for Europe
and the USA are considered in the table
finance in Denmark while Izquierdo et al. (2010) find a positive impact for Spain.
Whether these differences come frommodeling choices or fromcountry characteristics
is unclear, which makes cross-country comparisons problematic and policy making
coordination difficult.2 One of our contributions to the literature is to provide a set
of consistent estimates for four representative European countries, Austria, Germany,
Poland and the UK, suitable for policy comparison and coordination.
In order to provide consistent estimates for different countries, we use the same
overlapping-generations model calibrated for each country. The model is standard
but rich to accommodate differences in institutional settings and labor markets across
countries. In particular, the pay-as-you-go pension system, with flat and earnings-
related parts, captures financial incentives for postponed retirement. As the skill distri-
bution of immigrant and native populations differ, households are separated into three
skill classes. Because social security contributions and benefits depend on labor mar-
ket status in different ways in different countries, the labor market is modeled in detail.
Specifically, the labormarket is imperfect and households choose education into one of
three skill levels, aswell as labormarket participation, job search efforts if unemployed
and work hours if employed. Migration in and out of the country is exogenous. In line
with empirical evidence, foreign workers have worse prospects on the labor market
even at equivalent skill level, which we model with exogenous and constant penalties.
We find that future immigration flows, as projected by Eurostat (2011), have dif-
ferent contributions to old-age social security financing across countries. Projected
immigration flows after 2015 are equivalent to 14.3% points labor income taxes in
Austria, 7.3 in Germany, 6.2 in the UK and 1.7 in Poland for a comparable public
finance position in 2060. As immigrants are younger, a permanent immigration inflow
raises the proportion of households who are in the contributing phase of their life
and decreases the proportion of households who are in the benefit phase of life. The
resulting broadening of the tax base allows for a relative reduction of the tax rate.
2 Fehr et al. (2003) provide estimates for Japan, the US and Europe as a region which can be compared.
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One obvious reason for cross-country differences is that projected immigration
volumes differ, being about three times larger forAustria and theUK than forGermany,
and eight times larger than for Poland, relative to population size. This is however not
the only reason. Hypothetically assuming relative future immigration volumes as in
Germany for all countries, immigration is equivalent to 5.7 % points labor income
taxes in Austria, 3.9 in Poland and 2.1 in the UK, compared to 7.3 in Germany.
Another factor is differences in institutions. For instance, the pension system in the
UK has a Beveridgean nature with a focus on minimum income, while Germany
has a Bismarckian pension system with a strong earnings-related part, which is more
expensive. With identical immigration volumes, public finance gains are more limited
in the UK than in Germany because the pension system is comparatively cheaper.
Further contributing factors are the age structure of the population, the distribution of
skills and the production structure.
From a policy perspective, our results provide another rationale for cross-country
differences in immigration policy. Mayda (2006) empirically finds that labor market
concerns, alongwith noneconomic factors, are related to differences in attitudes toward
immigration across countries. Our study suggests that public finance concerns due
to population aging represent another economic factor behind immigration policy
heterogeneity: some countries benefit more over the long-term from immigration than
others.
The paper continues with four sections. In Sect. 2, we document stylized facts on
the demographics, migration and labor markets in Europe and explain our choice of
representative countries. In Sect. 3, we present the model. Results of our quantitative
investigations are contained in Sect. 4. Policy implications are derived in the following
section. Section 6 concludes.
2 Stylized facts and country sample
With low fertility and a decline in mortality, many developed countries are confronted
with a rapidly aging population. Based on demographic projections from Eurostat
(2011), the old-age dependency ratio in the European Union should rise from 26%
in 2014 to 53% in 2060. European countries however are not exposed to population
aging to the same extent: the old-age dependency ratios should increase from 28 to
46% (a 64% increase) in Sweden but jump from 17 to 62% (a 264% increase) in
Slovakia between 2010 and 2060.
The dependency ratio increase puts pressure on the financing of the welfare state
with stable retirement ages, as the ratio of workers over retirees drops. According to
the Ageing Working Group (2012), European Union expenditures on pensions, health
and long-term care will increase by 4% points of GDP between 2010 and 2060.
Immigration could have a positive impact on public finances of aging countries,
because immigrants are younger on average than the native population, which miti-
gates the drop in the ratio of workers over retirees. Volume of immigration however
differs across countries, Eurostat (2011) projections ranging from negative values (net
emigration) in Baltic states to a yearly average of 16 immigrants per 1000 inhabitants
in Luxembourg between 2010 and 2060.
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Fig. 1 Labor market integration of natives and foreigners by education level, Germany
To reach our goal of quantifying the long-run public finance contribution of immi-
gration, we use a general equilibriummodel calibrated for a representative selection of
European Union countries. The selection is made along three criteria influencing the
financing contribution of immigration: population aging speed, projected volume of
immigration and pension system type.3 The resulting selection is Austria, Germany,
Poland and the UK.
Austria has a Bismarckian pension system, is not aging fast and is exposed to
large immigration flows. The same holds for Germany except it is not exposed to
large immigration. Poland also has a Bismarckian system, but is aging fast and is
not exposed to large immigration. The UK has a Beveridgean pension system, is not
aging fast and is not exposed to large immigration. Other countries with Beveridgean
pensions are no different.4
To what extent immigration supports the long-term financing of social security
depends on the integration of immigrants in the labor market. In general, the literature
finds that most immigrants incur a penalty (see e.g., Algan et al. 2010). Figure 1,
based on LFS and SILCmicrodata, provides an illustration for Germany.5 These labor
market characteristics, which are country-specific, will be taken into account in our
model and its calibration.
3 Model
Overlapping-generations models have been typical tools for the analysis of the effect
of population aging on public finance, ever since Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). Pop-
ulation aging is indeed a slow process and thesemodels operate in general equilibrium,
of particular interest for long-run impacts without price rigidity (Buiter 1997). At the
core of the demographic process is the modification of the age structure of the popu-
lation, for which overlapping-generations analysis is well suited. The main modeling
cost is the reliance on (families of) representative agents, which render the models ill
suited for the analysis of distributional effects. In our case the cost is limited, given
3 We consider that a country is aging fast if its dependency ratio increases 150% or more and that it is
exposed to large immigration flows if the projected yearly inflows averagemore than 0.5 %of the population
between 2010 and 2060.
4 For further details on the selection procedure see appendix A, available online.
5 A person born in Germany is defined as native. Low skill is a person with 1997 ISCED education levels
0–2, medium skill levels 3–4 and high skill levels 5–6. See the online appendix A for details and figures for
Austria, Poland and the UK.
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the aggregate nature of our research question, concerned with macroeconomic and
public finance outcomes. Note also that overlapping-generations approaches assume
that the microempirical estimates used for calibration are representative of household
behavior not only over the short run, but also the long run. In this paper, we use the
strength of overlapping-generations but keep inmind assumptions in the interpretation
of results, focusing on conservative estimates.
The paper novelty and focus is cross-country comparability. Model developments
are limited to make comparisons with existing results of the literature easy. We com-
bine relevant model features from the existing literature and add a small extension,
migration.
Existing relevant model features are as follows. Data show that natives and for-
eigners have different labor market prospects and that differences in particular in
unemployment risk depend on skill level (see Fig. 1). We therefore use a model with
an overlapping-generations structure and unemployment as basis, Jaag et al. (2010).6
We add to this model three skill classes and endogenous education decisions following
Heckman et al. (1998). The modeling novelty of this paper is migration, which will
be presented in detail below.
For easier reading, we present the ideas of the model and refer to the technical
appendix Berger et al. (2016) for details.7
3.1 Description
3.1.1 Demographics
There are nine life cycle stages spread over three consecutive phases, starting with
education, continuing with work and finishing with retirement. Time periods last one
year. Life cycle stages can last several time periods. Wages have a life cycle profile
consistent with empirical earnings. Households differ in their nationality, learning
ability, birth date, death date and the speed at which they go through the stages of the
life cycle.8
At every stage a ∈ {1, . . . , 9}, households face a constant probability 1 − γ a of
dying and a probability γ a (1 − ωa) of moving to the next stage a + 1, with ω9 =
1. Households can stay in stage a several time periods. The conditional probability
1−ωa defines how quickly households move from one stage to the other, on average.
Following Blanchard (1985), a reverse life insurance allocates assets at death. At stage
aR households choose their retirement date.
6 There exist two other overlapping-generations analyses of population aging with unemployment in the
literature.Annabi et al. (2009) however assume inelastic labor supply,while pension benefits are independent
of unemployment history in de la Croix et al. (2013). Jaag et al. (2010) avoid these limitations.
7 The technical appendix is available upon request.
8 Speed differences lead to a stochastic life cycle structure, an extension to several age classes of the two-age
class stochastic structure of Gertler (1999). Analytical aggregation results, summarized below, remove this
degree of heterogeneity in the implementation. For ease of presentation, we use a simplified notation which
neglects this degree of heterogeneity. See Jaag et al. (2010) for a motivation and the technical appendix
Berger et al. (2016) for a presentation with the exhaustive notation.
123
Cross-country differences in the contribution of future…
We use an implementation where the average durations of stay in each life cycle
stage correspond to ages 15–19, 20–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–69, 70–79, 80–84
and 85+. We later use interchangeably the words “life cycle stage” and “age group”.
The threshold stage is aR = 6. Stages a ∈ {7, 8, 9} are full retirement stages but with
different probabilities of dying 1 − γ a , to better replicate the empirical age structure
of the population.
Households have different nationalities. Consistent with empirical evidence pre-
sented in Sect. 2, foreigners have different labor market prospects than natives. A
person with domestic citizenship is called a native (n = D for domestic citizenship)
and a person who immigrated in the country and does not have citizenship is called a
foreigner (n = F for foreign citizenship).9 Children of foreigners eventually become
citizens, having then different labormarket prospects than their parents. For simplicity,
we assume that only children of foreigners can acquire citizenship, at an assimilation
rate defined exogenously.
Households have different learning abilities and choose education efforts to end up
with one of three skill levels, i ∈ {l,m, h}, low, medium or high.
We allow for differences in fertility rate by age class and nationality. Ourmodel also
allows for partial inheritance of learning ability which differs by nationality, consistent
with Borjas (1992). These exogenous parameters define the number of labor market
entrants in each period.
3.1.2 Households
In each period, risk-neutral households make consumption and labor market-related
decisions in order to maximize expected lifetime utility. Preferences are represented
with the utility theory developed by Weil (1990), restricting individuals to being risk-
neutral but allowing for an arbitrary intertemporal elasticity of substitution:10
V at = max
[(
Qat
)ρ + γ aβ
(
GωaV at+1 + G(1 − ωa)V a+1t+1
)ρ]1/ρ
,
where V at is the expected remaining lifetime utility of a household in life cycle stage
a at time t , ρ defines the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1/(1− ρ), β is a time
discounting factor, Qat is effort-adjusted consumption (as per the definition provided
below) and G = 1 + g is the gross factor of growth by which the model is detrended.
Migration is modeled as an exogenous event, following an idiosyncratic shock: we
assume that economic prospects in the destination country are the same as in the origin
country, leaving households indifferent between migrating or not (consistent with the
long-run outcome of the two-sided migration analysis from Sinn 2000). When migra-
tion takes place, households carry financial assets and pension rights over the border.
9 Our definition of citizenship does not correspond to the legal definition and should be taken as an economic
definition of citizenship. For ease of reading, we only write citizenship.
10 For a lighter notation, we suppress the skill i and nationality n indices when they are not needed, and
only use the age class index a systematically, in the continuation.
123
J. Berger et al.
educate
much?
participate?
how many
hours to
supply?Low/Med/Hi
Skill
yes
no
many
not many get hour-dependent
after tax wage
get welfare benefits
Fig. 2 Sequence of household decisions related to the labor market
Households take a number of decisions related to the labor market, as illustrated
in Fig. 2. Before entering the labor market, households choose their education level,
depending on the learning ability they are given at birth and future expected earnings.
They enter the labor market in life cycle stage a = 1 if they do not educate beyond
compulsory school (respectively, a = 2 for a medium skill education and a = 3 for a
high skill education). After entering the labor market, they decide whether to partici-
pate or not (δa ∈ [0, 1] represents the fraction of time they participate11). Following
Jaag et al. (2010), we consider that non-participation during the retirement period aR
is equivalent to retirement and assume that the institutional setting forces households
of the same age, skill and nationality class to choose the same retirement date based
on average earnings, regardless of differences in earning history. As a simplification
needed for aggregation results, this assumption nonetheless captures dimensions of
the institutional settings which generate bunching in retirement decisions, such as
penalties for early retirement (French 2005). Households who work decide how many
hours to supply (la ≥ 0).
Households choose consumptionCa in every period. Labor and consumption trade-
offs are defined by preferences and the effort-adjusted consumption
Qat = Cat − ϕ¯a
(
δat , l
a
t
)
,
where ϕ¯a (·) is a convex increasing function in all its arguments which represents
the utility cost of efforts related to labor market activity expressed in goods equiv-
alent terms. Given the reverse life insurance, the intertemporal budget constraint of
households is
Gγ a Aat+1 = Rt+1
(
Aat + yat − Cat
)
,
where Aa is assets, ya net income flows and R = 1 + r the interest factor.
Households move through the life cycle at different speeds. Households in the same
life cycle stage a have in general different biographies and thus have been exposed
11 The instantaneous participation decision is binary. Over a time period, the household may however
participate part or all of the period (for instance, 5 months in a 1 year time period).
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to different wages through their life. Their labor income profiles being different, con-
sumption and saving decisions also differ. Within the same life cycle stage a, goods
consumption Cat , effort-adjusted consumption Q
a
t and assets A
a
t thus always depend
on the household biography. In Sect. 3.2, we present the numerical approach to deal
with heterogeneity in biographies.
3.1.3 Labor market and pension system
We assume a separate labor market for each life cycle stage a, skill class i and nation-
ality n. Equal to their marginal products, wages wa,i,n differ in each stage, skill and
nationality class but are identical for workers in the same class, taking productiv-
ity differentials into account. An age- and skill-dependent productivity parameter θa,i
gives the life cycle profile of wages and captures productivity differences between skill
classes. As labormarket prospects for natives and foreigners differ (see Fig. 1), produc-
tivity profiles also differ between them, θa,i,n . Productivity differentials θa,i,D/θa,i,F
are calibrated from wages data and kept constant over time, assuming labor market
prospects of foreigners neither improve nor worsen.12
Conditional on labor market participation, gross labor income equals
ya,i,npar,t = la,i,nt · θa,i,n · wa,i,nt .
When workers decide not to participate in the labor market, they collect net-of-tax
welfare benefits yanonpar,t , which are independent of wages and past earnings. When
workers are retired, they collect pension payments yapens,t , which mainly depend on
past earnings. Denoting τ at the labor income tax rate and assuming that each labor
market state (i.e., non-participation and employment) is visited in each time period,13
income flows are
yat =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
δat ·
(
1 − τ at
) · yapar,t +
(
1 − δat
) · yanonpar,t if a < aR,
δat ·
(
1 − τ at
) · yapar,t +
(
1 − δat
) · (1 − τ at
) · yapens,t if a = aR,(
1 − τ at
) · yapens,t if a > aR .
Not only wages and labor income taxes influence labor supply, but also the pay-as-
you-go pension system. Pension payments yapens,t indeed have a flat part, independent
of past earnings and comprising anti-poverty benefits, as well as an earnings-related
part. The stronger the earnings-related part, the larger the incentive for workers to
provide labor supply along all margins, ceteris paribus. Pension payments are given
by yapens,t = νa Pat + Pa0,t , where Pa0,t is a flat part, Pat represents acquired pension
12 In reality, foreign workers suffer a penalty for economic reasons (e.g., worse language skills) and for
noneconomic reasons (e.g., discrimination at recruiting). The noneconomic penalty could vary over time
with either improved assimilation or cultural backlash, whichwould affect the immigration impact on public
finance, an analysis left for future research.
13 An equivalent assumption is income pooling (perfect insurance) within each age, skill and nationality
class, as used for instance in the real business cycle and unemployment theory of Andolfatto (1996).
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rights and νa is a conversion factor between pension rights and pension payments.14
Pension rights can be accumulated with labor market participation, given by Pat+1 =
δat y
a
par,t + Pat . Building on Gruber and Wise (2005), penalties for early retirement and
incentives for postponed retirement are provided during the retirement decision period
with a modified conversion factor yapens,t =
(
1 + σ (δat − δR
))
νa Pat + Pa0,t for age
a = aR , given a statutory retirement age δR and incentive factor σ ≥ 0.
3.1.4 Production
There is a representative firm facing perfect competition, producing a single composite
good with capital and three types of labor, corresponding to the three skill levels
of workers. The production function, a linearly homogeneous nested CES function
following Jaag (2009), is specified to ensure balanced growth at an exogenous rate g
in equilibrium steady states. Firms make investment decisions to maximize the flow
of dividends they generate.
The gross interest factor R = 1 + r is exogenous, as in a small open economy.
Changes in the production process are costly variations in the capital stock and subject
to capital adjustment costs, following Hayashi (1982).
There is imperfect substitution between the various types of labor. We assume
capital-skill complementarity, an empirically realistic feature which can account for
wage inequality variations (Krusell et al. 2000). While labor inputs from workers with
different skill levels are imperfect substitutes, we consider that inputs from native
and foreign workers of the same skill level conditional on productivity are perfect
substitutes, consistent with Borjas (2003).15
3.1.5 Government
The state provides welfare benefits, pay-as-you-go pensions and investment subsi-
dies. Government expenditures include public consumption, defined exogenously in
per capita terms. They also include long-term care and health expenditures, defined
exogenously in per capita and age terms.
To finance expenditures, the government collects taxes and social security contri-
butions. The government can borrow on the capital market (without premium on the
interest rate) to finance public debt, which we keep constant.
Pension payments to migrants are partially paid by the origin country and partially
by the destination country, in proportion of the pension points earned in the respective
countries.
3.1.6 Equilibrium
Under the small open economy assumption, the goods market clears via trade with
the rest of the world. Holdings of foreign assets by domestic households evolve with
14 In Germany and Poland, sustainability mechanisms automatically adjust parameters of the pension
system. Our simulations will take it into account.
15 Unlike Borjas (2003), Ottaviano and Peri (2012) assume imperfect substitutability. As discussed by
Borjas et al. (2008), direct empirical evidence on (in)substitutability is however still inconclusive.
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changes in the trade balance. The assetmarket clears in a standard fashion, net financial
assets Aat of households being split between holdings of public debt, foreign assets
and assets invested in firms.
3.1.7 Full model
For precise estimates in the quantitative evaluation, we use a more complete model
with imperfect labor markets, public unemployment insurance and intervivo transfers,
all following Jaag et al. (2010). Unemployment is due to matching frictions, using the
static search framework fromBoone andBovenberg (2002). Unemployment insurance
has a flat part and an earnings-related part.With joy-of-giving preferences, households
derive utility from intervivos transfers. Related joy-of-giving preference parameters
are calibrated to match empirical age profiles of consumption.
3.2 Analysis and solutions
The model is comprehensive in household decisions and institutions and cannot be
solved analytically. Numerical computation will be used to find solutions. Some ana-
lytical results are however essential. Because householdsmove through the life cycle at
different speeds, their earnings histories, wealth and consumption decisions differ. One
can however derive optimality conditions from the individual, history-dependent level
to an age-, skill- and nationality-class level to obtain average consumption decisions
within each class. This aggregation procedure allows to solve numerically the model
at the class level, for a much reduced degree of heterogeneity. Details are contained
in online appendix C.
3.3 Calibration
The calibration follows a standard approach whose outcome is in line with literature
standards. Details are contained in online appendix D.
Parameters for institutions are taken from the MISSOC database and OECD’s
Tax-Benefit model. Average personal income tax rates and exogenous labor mar-
ket penalties for foreign workers are computed with EU-SILC microdata. European
countries have enacted pension reforms with immediate or future implementation. We
borrowpension parameter adjustments from theAgeingWorkingGroup (2012), which
takes these reforms into account, including sustainability mechanisms for Poland and
Germany. Aggregate pension expenditures, an endogenous outcome of the model, are
comparable to projections from the Ageing Working Group (2012). We take health
and long-term care age-dependent expenditure projections from the same source.
We rely on empirical studies to define labor supply elasticity parameters following
the literature discussion in Immervoll et al. (2007).
The education of children is influenced both by parents and by schools. The gap
between these two influences can be large when parents are foreigners. A skill inheri-
tance matrix reflects these diverse influences for children of foreigners. The gap being
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smaller for natives, their children choose their education level based on future expected
earnings.
We rely on the 2010 demographic projections from Eurostat (2011) to set net
migration, fertility and age-dependent mortality rates. The skill distribution in future
migration flows is constant and equal to its 2010 value.
4 Quantitative results
This section presents the simulation results. We compare labor market, macroeco-
nomic and public finance outcomes between 2010 and 2060 in different demographic
scenarios for Austria, Germany, Poland and the UK. Namely we compare outcomes
in the benchmark cases using the Eurostat migration projections with outcomes in the
hypothetical case where immigration to Austria, Germany, Poland or the UK stops
after 2015.16
In all cases, we finance the increase in social security expenditures due to aging
alone with lump-sum taxes. This choice delivers conservative estimates and prevents
unbalanced distortion across our experiments.17
Section 4.1 presents and discusses results for each country, andSect. 4.2 investigates
factors driving cross-country differences. The impact of our methodological choices
is evaluated in online appendix E, which shows that endogenous participation margins
matter and that results are robust to alternative modeling of the specific German pen-
sion sustainability mechanism. For ease of presentation, we discuss outcomes for one
country alone when differences between countries do not matter. Germany is chosen
for this role, because other countries have either low or high projected immigration.
4.1 Single-country outcomes
While the impact of immigration changes is limited in the short run, it is large in the
long run. Tables 2 and 3 provide the simulation results, comparing long-run outcomes
with and without immigration for Austria, Germany, Poland and the UK. We start
with a presentation of the results for Germany, a presentation which also applies
qualitatively to the other countries.
The right part of Table 2 displays the demographic, labor market, macroeconomic
and public finance equilibrium in 2010 and four different cases in 2060 for Germany.
The benchmark case (Mig column) assumes migration as per the Eurostat (2011)
projections. The three other cases assume an end to immigration after 2015. In these
three cases, the end of immigration leads to a net loss of public revenue.We compensate
16 We focus on the case where the border is closed to foreign workers only because it reflects best the
policy debate. Sensitivity analysis where the border is closed to native and foreign workers finds smaller
but comparable outcomes (unreported).
17 Increases in expenditures due to the end of immigration are financed with a different instrument in
each experiment, to be detailed in Sect. 4.1. Because the disincentive effects of taxation increase over-
proportionallywith taxes, financing population agingwith distortive taxationwould lead to a small distortion
in some experiments and a large distortion in other experiments. Lump-sum tax financing avoids this
imbalance.
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the public revenue loss with a change in the tax and social security system so that the
per capita public finance position of the country is identical to the benchmark case,
which we consider happens if the government budget is balanced with the same level
of per capita lump-sum taxation as in the benchmark case. In one case (No Mig Tax
column), the loss of revenue due to the end of immigration is compensated by an
increase in labor income taxes. In another case (No Mig Cut column), the loss of
revenue due to the end of immigration is compensated by a cut in pension benefits. In
the last case (No Mig Ret column), the loss of revenue is compensated by an increase
in retirement age.
For an identical public finance position, immigration flows are equivalent to 7.3%
points lower labor income taxes (No Mig Tax), a 5.6% points higher pension benefit
ratio (No Mig Cut compared to Mig) or 2.5 years earlier retirement in 2060 (No Mig
Ret compared to Mig). To illustrate the importance of these outcomes, 7.3 % points
of labor incomes taxes correspond to 4.7% of GDP of public revenue.
Including outcomes for all countries, the summary result of this section is:
Finding 1 For identical public finance positions in 2060, future projected immigration
is equivalent to 7.3% points lower labor income taxes, 5.6% points higher pension
benefit ratio or 2.5years earlier retirement in Germany, and qualitatively similarly
for Austria, Poland and the UK. Specifically, future projected immigration flows are
equivalent in 2060 to...
Austria Germany Poland UK
Labor income tax (% points) −14.3 −7.3 −1.7 −6.2
Pension benefit ratio (% points) +15.4 +5.6 +1.0 +6.4
Retirement age (years) −4.9 −2.5 −0.4 −5.1
Effects are qualitatively identical across countries but quantitatively different. To
finish this subsection, we provide a discussion of qualitative effects. Because these
effects are identical, we provide a discussion for Germany only. Similar conclusions
apply to Austria, Poland and the UK. We investigate cross-country quantitative dif-
ferences in Sect. 4.2.
Results are driven by mechanical effects, behavioral reactions and general equi-
librium effects. Note also that Table 2 reveals economic differences between policy
scenarios: while the public finance position is identical, the state of the economy is
not. We discuss effects for the three cases without immigration.
4.1.1 Tax increase
Because immigrants are on average younger, the dependency ratio is mechanically
higher without immigration flows (66%without immigration flows versus 60%with).
At constant statutory retirement age (NoMig Tax case), the share of retirees and aggre-
gate pension expenditures are thus larger without immigration flows. The necessary
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increase in labor income taxes to keep the overall per capita public finance deficit con-
stant adds a behavior effect, as it depresses labor supply incentives along intensive and
extensive margins (effective employment, which sums up labor supply effects along
all margins net of demographic variations, decreases to 556 yearly worked hours per
capita instead of 592) and thus social security contributions.
4.1.2 Pension cuts
A second option to finance the loss of revenue which comes with the stop in immi-
gration is to reduce (earnings-related) pension benefits (NoMig Cut case). Behavioral
reactions have visible intertemporal optimization dimensions, both for consumption
and labor supply decisions. As pension benefits are reduced (11% points drop in the
benefit ratio in the No Mig Cut case instead of 5.4 in the Mig case), households work
and save more to self-finance consumption in old age, relative to other scenarios (576
worked hours per capita and 37.5% increase in assets per capita in the No Mig Cut
case instead of 556hours and 31.5% in the No Mig Tax case).
4.1.3 Retirement age increase
A third option to finance the loss of revenue brought by the end of immigration is to
make a reform to increase the effective retirement age (No Mig Ret case). With less
workers in retirement, social security contributions increase and pension expenditures
decline. The necessary increase of 2.5years is however large.18 This outcome is driven
by composition effects, general equilibrium effects and the need to finance all social
security expenditures, beyond pensions. As health expenditures per capita increase
with age, an older population means larger aggregate health expenditures.
Since the foreign population has lower education on average, the average worker
productivity is higher when immigration is stopped, resulting in a higher marginal
product of labor and higher average wages (1.6% increase in gross wages in the No
Mig Ret case versus −0.8% in the Mig case). The earnings-related part of pension
payments is thus higher, and so are aggregate pension expenditures. Because finances
of the pension system are not balanced (contributions do not cover payments), these
larger per capita increases in social security expenditures need to be financed with an
increase in the retirement agewhich goes beyond equalizing the fraction of pensioners.
4.1.4 Other comment
In all cases, output and consumption per capita drop in 2060 between 10 and 20%,
relative to the productivity growth trend. Population aging leads to significant drops in
labor supply per capita (from 720hours in 2010 to 620 or less). With constant interest
rates, firms keep the marginal product of capital constant by reducing investment and
capital per capita in a commensurate fashion. Output then drops as much as production
inputs, and consumption opportunities follow. The drop is lower when retirement age
18 Indeed, equating the fraction of pensioners is not sufficient: 41.7% of the population in the No Mig Ret
case versus 42.3% in the Mig case (unreported numbers).
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is increased (No Mig Ret), as labor supply per capita drops less. Consumption drops
however less than output per capita. Households save indeed more to maintain living
standards over a longer period of time after retirement, given life expectancy increase:
assets per capita are at least 25% larger in 2060 than 2010. Since the increase in the
retirement period is lowest when the retirement age is postponed (No Mig Ret case),
the increase in savings is lowest (25%). The increase is largest (38 %) when pensions
are cut (No Mig Cut case) because households need to compensate for the loss in
earnings-related pension revenue.
4.2 Cross-country analysis
While the previous subsection provides and discusses the results on a single-country
basis, this subsection provides an analysis of cross-country differences.
As shown in the previous subsection, the contribution of projected immigration
flows to the long-run financing of old-age social security expenditures differs across
countries (finding 1). An obvious reason for the difference is the projected volume
of immigration, which varies across country: while immigration is projected to reach
0.43% of the total population in Austria in 2060, it is projected to reach 0.38% in the
UK, 0.12% in Germany and 0.05% in Poland.
To investigate the role of immigration volumes in differences of outcomes across
countries, we repeat the tax gain analysis of the previous subsection with a counter-
factual migration scenario where volumes are identical for all countries. Specifically,
relative to population size we assume that projected immigration volumes after 2015
in Austria, Poland and UK are the same as in Germany, whose projected immigration
lay in the middle of the group.
Table 4 presents the outcomes of the experiment. Key demographic and pub-
lic finance variables are reported for all four countries.19 Outcomes of simulations
assuming country-specific immigration volumes (in columns Cty-Spec Mig Vol) are
compared to outcomes assuming immigration volumes equal to volumes for Germany
(in columnsDEMig Vol). The first outcomes (in columns Cty-Spec Mig Vol) are taken
from tables 2 and 3 and repeated for convenience. As expressed in finding 1, labor
income taxes in Austria would have to be raised by 14.3% points in 2060 (NoMig Tax
column) if the projected volume of immigration into Austria (0.43% of the population
in 2060, Mig column) was stopped after 2015, in order to reach the same per capita
public finance position with or without immigration (per capita lump-sum transfers
variation of 9.8 hundreds of numeraire units in columnsMig andNoMig Tax). In other
words, for Austria a yearly immigration shock of magnitude 0.43% of the population
is equivalent to a 14.3% points labor tax increase in public finance terms in 2060.
Similarly, columns DE Mig Vol show that a yearly immigration shock of magnitude
0.12% of the population is equivalent to a 5.7% points labor tax increase in 2060
public finance terms in Austria. With different immigration volumes, the tax gain is
larger in Austria than Germany (14.3 vs. 7.3% points). With identical immigration
volumes, the tax gain is now smaller in Austria than Germany but the difference is
19 Compared to Tables 2 and 3, only the immigration volume variable is new.
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Table 4 Simulation results, country-specific and German migration volumes
Cty-Spec Mig Vol DE Mig Vol
2010 2060 2060 2060 2060
ISS Mig No Mig Tax Mig No Mig Tax
AT
Demographics
Immigration volume (% pop) 0.32 0.43 0.00 0.12 0.00
Dependency ratio 26.27 50.24 62.77 57.73 62.77
Public finance
Labor income tax (% points ISS) – 0.00 14.25 0.00 5.70
Lump-sum transfer/capita – −9.79 −9.79 −11.73 −11.73
DE
Demographics
Immigration volume (% pop) 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.00
Dependency ratio 31.35 59.67 66.43 59.67 66.43
Public finance
Labor income tax (% points ISS) – 0.00 7.31 0.00 7.31
Lump-sum transfer/capita – −12.15 −12.15 −12.15 −12.15
PL
Demographics
Immigration volume (% pop) 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.00
Dependency ratio 22.21 58.81 59.74 57.70 59.74
Public finance
Labor income tax (% points ISS) – 0.00 1.70 0.00 3.90
Lump-sum transfer/capita – −3.78 −3.78 −3.28 −3.28
UK
Demographics
Immigration volume (% pop) 0.56 0.38 0.00 0.12 0.00
Dependency ratio 26.51 40.48 49.04 45.81 49.04
Public finance
Labor income tax (% points ISS) – 0.00 6.17 0.00 2.14
Lump-sum transfer/capita – −6.04 −6.04 −6.23 −6.23
Cty-Spec Mig Vol: country-specific migration volumes; DE Mig Vol: migration volumes as Germany, rel-
ative to population; Mig: corresponding baseline migration scenario; No Mig Tax: immigration end after
2015, increase in labor income taxes for identical public finance deficit (per capita lump-sum transfer) as
corresponding Mig cases; see Table 2 for more comments
smaller (5.7 vs. 7.3% points). The result of the experiment can be summarized as
follows:
Finding 2 There are differences across countries in the long-term impact of immi-
gration on public finance which are partially, but not completely, due to differences
in the volume of projected immigration. The same (hypothetical) future immigration
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volume in all countries is equivalent to 2.1% points lower labor income taxes in the
UK, 3.9% points in Poland, 5.7% points in Austria and 7.3% points in Germany.
Additional conclusions on cross-country differences can be derived with informa-
tion contained in finding 1:
Finding 3 Differences in social security institutions across countries contribute to
the difference in the long-term impact of immigration on public finance. For instance,
future projected immigration flows are equivalent to the same pension benefits gains
in the UK and in Germany (benefit ratio about 6 % points higher) but to twice larger
gains in retirement age in the UK than in Germany (respectively, 5 and 2.5years
earlier retirement).
Note that one can express finding 3 with other countries. For ease of presentation,
we keep our focus on Germany in the discussion of findings 2 and 3, reviewing each
pair of countries which involves Germany. A recurrent factor is the age structure of
populations.We detail this factor comparing Germany andAustria and brieflymention
it for Poland and the UK.
4.2.1 Differences between Germany and Austria
Differences in public finance outcomes come from the fact that Germany currently has
an older population than Austria. As shown in Table 4, the 2010 old-age dependency
ratio is 26% in Austria and 31% in Germany (column ISS). Immigrants being younger
on average, the end of immigration has then a gradual but more dramatic impact on
the dependency ratio in Germany than in Austria: under identical immigration volume
projections (columns DE Mig Vol), relative to the immigration case the dependency
ratio increases 5%pointsmorewhen immigration is stopped inAustria (62.8-57.7) and
6.7% points more in Germany (66.4–59.7). Germany and Austria having comparable
institutional settings, but Germany aging faster, a higher increase in labor income taxes
is needed in Germany to finance the end of immigration (7.3% points increase in taxes
in Germany, 5.7 in Austria).
A simple arithmetic calculation provides indications that the population age struc-
ture is the main driver: if the dependency ratio increased 6.7 % points in Austria
(instead of 5 % points) as in Germany and the labor income tax variations were related
proportionally to dependency ratio variations, the tax increase in Austria would be
7.6% points,20 close to the increase for Germany.
4.2.2 Differences between Germany and Poland
On top of the current population age structure (see differences between Germany
and Austria), skill distributions and production structures also matter. With identical
immigration volumes, the old-age dependency ratio increases less for Poland than
Germany. Using the same arithmetic calculation as for Austria, the labor income tax
increase for Poland would however be 12.9% points if the dependency ratio increased
20 7.6 = 5.7 × 0.0675/0.0504.
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6.7% points in Poland (instead of 2 % points), larger than the 7.3 points tax increase
in Germany. Other factors push for a larger tax increase in Poland and counteract
the influence of the differences in population age structures21: differences in skill
distributions and their impact on tax revenue is one of them; differences in production
structures is another one.
Immigrants have a lower skill level than natives in Germany (5% points fewer
high-skilled immigrant households) while they have a higher skill level in Poland
(with 19%pointsmore high-skilled immigrant households). Labor tax schedules being
progressive in both countries, skilledworkers beingmore productive and earningmore,
the end of immigration then leads to a sharper decline in tax revenue in Poland than
Germany, and a larger need to compensate the end of immigration with an increase in
tax rates, ceteris paribus.
The capital share in production is larger in Poland than in Germany, at 47 versus
37%, respectively. Ceteris paribus, the labor income share, the wage sum and the labor
income tax revenues are smaller in Poland. The end of immigration thus triggers the
need for a larger tax rate increase to reach the same tax revenue.
4.2.3 Differences between Germany and the UK
In addition to the current population age structure (see differences between Germany
and Austria), institutional differences also matter, both for findings 2 and 3. Using
the same arithmetic calculation as for Austria, the labor income tax increase for the
UK would be 4.5% points if the dependency ratio increased 6.7% points in the UK
(instead of 3.2 % points), smaller than the 7.3 points increase in Germany. On top of
differences in population age structures, other factors also explain why taxes need to
be increased more in Germany.
Population aging is less of a challenge in the UK than Germany. On the one hand,
the old-age dependency ratio remains comparatively low in the UK, in 2010 as well
as in 2060 with or without immigration (26% in 2010 and 49% in 2060 for the UK,
compared to 31 and66%respectively forGermany).On the other hand, theUKpension
system has a Beveridgean nature, with a lower and flatter replacement rate and a focus
on minimum income, while Germany has a Bismarckian pension system with a strong
earnings-related component. As a result, aggregate pension expenditures are lower in
the UK (8% of GDP in 2010 for the UK versus 12% of GDP for Germany). Thus,
slower population aging and a cheaper pension system reduce the need to increase
taxes in the UK, with or without immigration, which explains finding 2.
Other characteristics of the pension system explain finding 3, namely Gruber-Wise
incentives: early retirement is more heavily penalized and postponed retirement more
heavily rewarded in the UK than in Germany (see OECD 2013). When the end of
immigration is financed with higher labor income taxes, which are changed for all
age classes in the same proportion, the difference in Gruber-Wise incentives plays
21 Population age structure differences push to a smaller tax increase for Poland than Germany. Only if
the Polish tax increase (with counterfactual immigration volumes) was smaller than 3.9% points could the
simple arithmetic computation lead to a tax increase close to the 7.3 points of Germany. Some factors push
for a larger tax increase in Poland, ceteris paribus.
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no important role. This difference also plays no important role when the end of
immigration is financed with lower pension benefit ratios. However, the difference
in Gruber-Wise incentives plays a significant role when the end of immigration is
financed with postponed retirement age: ceteris paribus, households in the UK get
higher pension benefit rewards than German households; hence, a further increase in
retirement age in the UK is needed to finance these additional benefits. This explains
why immigration brings about larger retirement age gains in the UK than Germany,
but only comparable pension benefit gains.
5 Policy implications
We provide context and four groups of implications relevant for policy analysis and
design, derived from results and analysis in Sect. 4.
5.1 Context
Immigration policy has long been an emotional topic of policy debate at the national
level. European countries also discuss and define joint control of immigration. Ini-
tially implemented by seven members of the European Union in 1995, the Schengen
Agreement eliminates internal border controls and establishes a common visa policy.
Gradually, other countries have signed the agreement: 20 years later, 26 European
countries are members of the Schengen Area. In its 2015 work program, the executive
branch of the European Union has listed migration policy as one of its 10 priori-
ties, pushing beyond political asylum and security to include long-term demographic
challenges (European Commission 2014).
5.2 Immigration contribution
Future immigration has a positive contribution to the long-term financing of old-age
social security expenditures with an aging population in Europe. This result is quali-
tatively consistent with the existing literature (see Table 1).22 Because immigrants are
younger on average, a permanent immigration inflow increases the share of households
who contribute to social security and reduces the share of households who benefit from
it. The resulting broadening of the tax base allows for a relative reduction of tax rates,
increase of pension benefits or decrease of the statutory retirement age.
5.3 Size of immigration contribution
To what extent immigration contributes to long-term public financing depends on
demographic, institutional and labormarket characteristics of the country. The analysis
22 Schou (2006) is the only general equilibrium analysis having a different qualitative result. See the
discussion in Schou (2006) for possible explanations.
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in Sect. 4.2 shows that the same volume of immigration has a larger contribution to
long-term public finance when…
– the population is old (with a large old-age dependency ratio); or
– immigrants are comparatively younger than the native population; or
– the average skill level of workers is higher for immigrants (leading to a higher
increase in public finance revenue); or
– the pension system has a strong earnings-related component (typical of Bismar-
ckian systems) as opposed to a focus on minimum income guarantees (typical of
Beveridgean systems).
Immigration is however not sufficient to ensure the financing of old-age social security
expenditures with an aging population, because effects are not linear.23 To finance old-
age expenditures, reforms appear unavoidable (for a review of options, see Bovenberg
2003).
5.4 Policy complementarity
The institutional setup and labor markets influence the joint design of immigration
policy and old-age social security. Future immigration flows provide the same retire-
ment age benefits in Austria and the UK (+5 years needed in 2060 if immigration
stops after 2015) but different pension payment benefits (−15% points in the pension
replacement rate in 2060, respectively, -6 points, with no immigration after 2015),
because of financial incentives for postponed retirement in the UK (see finding 1 for
more). Pro-immigration policies can be combined with pension reforms which benefit
the native population to secure popular support. The choice of the pension reform
depends on complementarity effects. If pro-immigration policy reforms are combined
with gains in retirement duration, they are equally likely to win popular support in the
UK and in Austria, ceteris paribus. If on the other hand pro-immigration reforms are
associated with larger pension benefits, popular support is more likely in Austria than
in the UK.
5.5 Cross-country policy heterogeneity
Immigration policy differs across European countries, as illustrated for instance during
the 2015European refugee crisis.24 Why some countries aremore open to immigration
than others is an open research question, the literature searching for the determinants of
immigration policy (for a critical review, see Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). Our long-
term public finance analysis provides another rationale for cross-country differences in
23 Unreported simulations show that a doubling of the projected immigration flow in Germany would only
reduce the yearly social security deficit by 1 % points of GDP in 2060: doubling the flow would move the
deficit from 10.5% of GDP to 9.5% of GDP.
24 Our simulations would need to be updated to estimate the impact of the refugee crisis, a temporary
increase in immigration flows. First, the volumes are larger and effects are not linear. Second, the skill
distribution may vary, with more low-skilled immigrations. The crisis still illustrates the cross-country
differences in policy stance.
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Fig. 3 Immigration financial contribution and migrants integration policy index
immigration policy, namely the long-term public finance contribution of immigration,
which can be small or large. Countries with a higher long-term contribution of future
immigration may be more open to immigrants today. Leaving empirical analysis for
future research, Fig. 3 illustrates the potential of such an explanation. The figure
compares our quantitative estimates of the contribution of immigration to the long-
term financing of old-age social security expenditures (where benefits are expressed
in terms of labor income taxes gains; see finding 1) with a comprehensive index of
immigrants integration policy (MIPEX; see Huddleston et al. 2015). Although the
correlation is not perfect, it is positive: the larger the long-term public finance benefit,
the stronger the migrants integration policy.
6 Concluding remarks
Because immigrants are younger, immigration flows could help finance old-age social
security expenditures in developed countries with an aging population. The contribu-
tion of future immigration to the financing of these expenditures varies by countries,
depending on the volume of immigration, the institutional setup and other factors.
General equilibrium estimates provided so far in the literature have been calculated
with the use of different models, preventing comparisons across countries. We use the
same overlapping-generations model to provide comparable estimates and analyze the
source of differences.
For the same hypothetical immigration volume, we find that the contribution of
future immigration is equivalent to 2.1% points labor income taxes in the UK, 3.9
points in Poland, 5.7 points in Austria and 7.3 points in Germany in 2060. These
variations may in part explain differences in immigration policy stances across the
European Union.
Drivers for cross-country differences depend on the characteristics of each country
and of the immigration flows. Among important factors are: a pension system focused
on minimum income with a small earnings-related part for the UK; high skill content
in immigration flows balanced with a currently young population for Poland; high
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pension replacement rate with a strong earnings-related component in pensions for
Austria; and a strong earnings-related component in pensions with an old population
and low skill content in immigration flows for Germany.
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